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Abstract
A generalization of the coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS)—the state-of-the-art inter-
change scheduling—is proposed. Referred to as generalized coordinated transaction scheduling
(GCTS), the proposed approach addresses major seams issues of CTS: the ad hoc use of proxy
buses, the presence of loop flow as a result of proxy bus approximation, and difficulties in dealing
with multiple interfaces. By allowing market participants to submit bids across market bound-
aries, GCTS also generalizes the joint economic dispatch that achieves seamless interchange
without market participants. It is shown that GCTS asymptotically achieves seamless interface
under certain conditions. GCTS is also shown to be revenue adequate in that each regional
market has a non-negative net revenue that is equal to its congestion rent. Numerical examples
are presented to illustrate the quantitative improvement of the proposed approach.
Index Terms:Interchange scheduling, joint economic dispatch, seams issues, real-time electric-
ity market, coordinated transaction scheduling, loop flow problem.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Much of the power grid in North America is operated by independent system operators (ISOs). Each
ISO is responsible for the administration of the electricity market in its operating area. Neighboring
areas are connected by tie-lines, which makes it physically possible for one ISO to import power from
or export power to its neighbors. It thus makes economic sense that an ISO with high generation
price imports power from its neighbors that have excess and less costly resources.
The process of setting power transfer from one regional market to another, generally referred
to as the interchange scheduling, is nontrivial. If maximizing the overall system efficiency is the ob-
jective, the power flow across different operating areas should be determined by the joint economic
dispatch (JED) that treats the entire operating region as one and minimizes the overall generation
cost. But efficiency is not the only goal that governs the operations of ISOs.
ISOs in the deregulated electricity market must operate under the principles of fair repre-
sentations of stakeholders (including market participants) and the financial neutrality, i.e., the
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independence with respect to traders of the market [1, Page 152-153]. As a result, ISOs rely on
market participants to set the level of power transfer across market boundaries. These market
participants aim to profit from arbitrage opportunities by submitting bids to buy from one area
and offers to sell in another. It is then the responsibility of ISOs who assume no financial position
in the process to clear and settle these bids in a fair and transparent fashion.
As pointed out in [2], short-term operational efficiency is not always aligned with financial
neutrality; there is an inherent cost associated with any market solution. A market solution to
interchange scheduling creates the so-called “seams problem” as defined by the additional price
gap over the interface compared against the seamless operation by a single “super ISO”. The hope
is that a well-designed market solution becomes more efficient as the number of market participants
increases, ultimately achieving seamless interfaces, and improves the long-term performance. To
our knowledge, there is no existing market solution that provably achieves the efficiency of JED.
The goal of this paper is to fill, at least partially, this gap.
1.2 Literature Review
The interchange scheduling is a classical problem, which goes back to the 1980s [3]. Existing
solutions can be classified into two categories. The first is based on JED and aims to achieve by
neighboring ISOs the best efficiency in a distributed fashion. To this end, there is an extensive
literature based on primal decomposition methods [4–8] and dual decomposition methods [9–12].
These methods, unfortunately, are not compatible with the existing market structure because they
remove arbitrage opportunities for external market participants, in essence, requiring ISOs to trade
directly with each other.
The second category includes market-based solutions that optimize the net interchange by clear-
ing interface bids with the coordination among ISOs [13,14]. These techniques ensure the financial
neutrality of ISOs but increase the overall generation cost. The state of the art is the coordinated
transaction scheduling (CTS), which has been recently approved by FERC for implementations in
ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, and MISO [15–17]. A key component of these methods is the use of proxy
buses as trading points for external market participants. In the clearing process, power interchange
is represented by injections and withdrawals at proxy buses. Consequently, the actual power flow
may differ from the schedule, causing the so-called loop flow problem [18]. Furthermore, CTS is
limited to setting the interchange between two neighboring areas. In practice, an ISO may need
to set multiple interfaces simultaneously. An extension to interchange scheduling involving more
than two areas is nontrivial, see [19]. Generalizations to CTS to a stochastic setting is considered
in [20].
1.3 Contribution
This paper aims to bridge the gap between the ultimate seamless solution achieved by JED and the
more practical and necessarily market-based solutions. In particular, we propose a generalization
of CTS, referred to as GCTS, which achieves asymptotically seamless interfaces under certain
conditions. GCTS retains the structure of bidding, clearing, and settlement of CTS, thus causing no
interruption of existing market operations. A key improvement over CTS is that GCTS eliminates
the proxy bus approximation (thus the associated loop flow problem) inherent in all existing market-
based interchange solutions. Another advantage over existing techniques is that GCTS is shown to
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be revenue adequate, i.e., the net revenue of each ISO is non-negative and is equal to its congestion
rent.
GCTS can also be viewed as a generalization of JED with two modifications. First, similar
to CTS but different from JED, GCTS minimizes not only the total generation cost but also the
market cost of clearing interface bids. Second, similar to JED but different from CTS, GCTS solves
a distributed optimization problem with all network constraints as well as an additional constraint
that uses cleared interface bids to define the boundary state. This constraint is consistent with
the principle of an independent and financially neutral ISO in the sense that it is the market
participants who set the interchange.
GCTS does have its own shortcoming. Because GCTS solves a distributed optimization problem
as in JED, it has the computation cost similar to that of JED and is more costly than CTS. We
acknowledge but do not address this issue here except pointing out that some recent techniques
[5, 7, 8] that enjoy a finite-step convergence, which alleviate to some degree such costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first review the CTS approach in
Section II. In Section III, we present the model of multi-area power systems, the structure of
interface bids, and their clearing and settlement process. Properties of GCTS are established in
Section VI. Section V provides the results of simulations.
2 Coordinated Transaction Scheduling
In this section, we briefly review the state-of-the-art interchange mechanism CTS [13] in a deter-
ministic setting. For a stochastic version of CTS, see [19].
For ease of presentation, we consider throughout this paper a two-area power system illustrated
in Fig.1(a). The proposed GCTS for more than two areas is straightforward and illustrated in the
Appendix. We define a boundary bus as one to which a tie-line connecting two areas is attached.
Other buses are called internal buses.
The system in Fig.1(a) is jointly operated by ISO 1 and ISO 2. In particular, each ISO controls
the interior of its operating region defined by internal buses, and the two operators control jointly
operating boundaries defined by boundary buses. The interchange problem is a two-stage process
in which the neighboring ISOs jointly set the boundary state in a look-ahead scheduling, and each
ISO optimizes internal states in real time subject to fixed interchange schedules.
In CTS, as shown in Fig.1(b), a “proxy bus” is selected among external boundary buses1 in each
area as a trading location of market participants who submit interface bids to the coordinator2.
Each interface bid is a pair of buying and selling bids at proxy buses. They represent market
participants’ interest to arbitrage in a certain direction, which changes with the anticipated price
gap. These bids are used to set the interchange defined as the net power transfer (rather than
power flows on tie-lines) across boundaries.
Each interface bid has three attributes: an anticipated price difference ∆pi at proxy buses,
a maximal quantity smax, and an import/export direction. CTS bids are cleared 15-30 minutes
prior to individual real-time markets by the coordinator. The clearing process is based on the
minimizing of generation cost and the payoff to market participants. To this end, the coordinator
1In case of internal buses of the neighboring area being placed as trading locations, we can preserve these trading
buses in the equivalent network on the boundary in Fig.5(b). Thereby, similar method can be derived. For simplicity,
we assume hereafter that all interface bids are at boundary buses
2It is NYISO in the implementation between New York and New England
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Figure 1: The model of the interconnected power system and the proxy-bus model in CTS
collects demand/supply curves from system operators that are used in conjunction of bids from
market participants to determine the interchange quantity. The demand/supply curve from each
operator is obtained by computing the expected LMP at the proxy bus for its neighboring area for
each interchange level3.
∆pi 
Figure 2: Illustration of CTS’s clearing without tie-line congestion
We use the graphical representation in Fig.2 from [13] to illustrate the clearing principle of CTS
without tie-line congestion. Therein, curve pii(q) represents the incremental cost of generation for
Area i, and Q is the interface capacity. In this example, the direction of interchange is from Area
1 to Area 24, so pi1(q) and pi2(q) serve as supply and demand curves, respectively. The third price
curve pi2(q) − ∆pi(q) is the adjusted curve of pi2(q) by subtracting the aggregated interface bids
∆pi(q). CTS interchange schedule qCTS is set at the intersection of pi1(q) and pi2(q) −∆pi(q). All
interface bids with prices lower than ∆pi(qCTS) are cleared.
3Injections and line capacities of the neighboring area are not used
4This is because pi1(0) < pi2(0). If pi1(0) > pi2(0), the direction would be opposite.
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Interface bids are separately settled in individual real-time markets where the proxy bus in-
jection is set as qCTS. The net interchange between the two areas will match with the scheduled
qCTS . The real-time LMP at proxy buses piRT
1
and piRT
2
are used to settle cleared interface bids.
We note that there is a time latency between the clearing of interface bids and the physical power
delivery. Such randomness may cause price deviations from the expected LMP difference at the
time of interface bid clearing. Therefore, market participants with cleared bid offers are exposed
to risks of losing money.
∆pi 
ρ/2
qCTS=Q
∆pi(qCTS) 
Shadow 
price
ρ/2 
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Figure 3: Illustration of CTS’s clearing with tie-line congestion
If there are tie-line congestions, i.e., the intersection of pi1(q) and pi2(q)−∆pi(q) is greater thanQ,
then the net interchange will be scheduled at qCTS = Q. There is pi2(q
CTS)−pi1(q
CTS) > ∆pi(qCTS).
In CTS, such a price difference ρ is equally partitioned into congestion prices for the two areas.
Specifically, interface bids are paid at (piRT
1
− ρ
2
) in Area 1 and charged at (piRT
2
+ ρ
2
) in Area 2,
respectively. Note that ρ is calculated in the look-ahead clearing process, whereas piRTi is determined
in the real-time dispatch.
We review the process of CTS and the role of interface bids via Fig. 4. Clearing interface bids
will create imbalances of local supply and demand in each area. Physically, as in Fig. 4(a), such
local imbalances naturally compel power to flow across tie-lines in a interconnected power system.
Financially, as shown in Fig. 4(b), there is no direct cash flow between the two ISOs. The payment
to excess power generations in Area 1 and the revenue from excess power consumptions in Area 2
are balanced by external market participants who buy from Area 1 and sell to Area 2. Note that,
cleared interface bids are financial contracts and do not physically generate or consume. They
simply provide financial compensations that allow each regional market to dispatch imbalanced
generations and consumptions so that power can flow across their boundaries.
Although it is reported that the CTS approach has to some extent ameliorated the seams issue,
inefficient scheduling still persists [21]. In particular, modeling the net interchange as the injection
to the proxy bus may be highly inaccurate when there are multiple tie-lines. In what follows, we
present a generalization of CTS by removing the proxy bus approximation.
3 Generalized CTS
3.1 Network Model
Without loss of generality, we assume that no generator or load is on the boundary bus. This
assumption is made for convenience of presentation. A boundary bus that has a generator can
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Figure 4: Physical power system versus the financial trading procedure.
be split into a fictitious internal bus with a generator and a boundary bus without injection. We
also assume that each internal bus has one generator and one load. Let gi be the vector of power
generations and di the vector of load in Area i.
We adopt the DC power flow model in this paper. Specifically, nodal phase angles are state
variables that are determined by active power injections. The state variables in Area i are par-
titioned into internal phase angles θi and boundary phase angles θ¯i. We also use θ¯ = [θ¯1, θ¯2]
T to
represent all boundary phase angles.
The DC power flow equation for the two-area power system in Fig.1(a) is


Y11 Y11¯
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y2¯2¯ Y2¯2
Y22¯ Y22




θ1
θ¯1
θ¯2
θ2

 =


g1 − d1
0
0
g2 − d2

 , (1)
where Y11¯ is the nodal admittance sub-matrix
5 associated with the internal and boundary buses in
Area 1, and Y1¯2¯ the sub-matrix associated with boundary buses in areas 1 and 2. Other terms in
the coefficient matrix in (1) are similarly defined.
An equivalent network that captures completely the electrical properties at the boundary of the
two networks can be derived as follows and is illustrated in Fig.5. Here boundary buses of Area
i have equivalent self-admittance Y˜i¯¯i, mutual-admittance Yi¯j¯, and generation g˜i¯. The power flow
equation for the equivalent network for the interface is
5The matrix Y is composed of reciprocals of branch reactance and differs from the bus admittance matrix used
in AC power flow model.
6
Figure 5: Boundary equivalent network model in GCTS
[
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
] [
θ¯1
θ¯2
]
=
[
g˜1¯
g˜2¯
]
, (2)
where
Y˜i¯¯i = Yi¯¯i − Yi¯iY
−1
ii Yi¯i, g˜i¯ = −Yi¯iY
−1
ii (gi − di). (3)
The coefficient matrix in (2) does not change with nodal power injections. Throughout this
paper, we assume that the two-area system is on the same island, so the coefficient matrix in (2) is
full rank after removing the reference bus. The equivalent power injection g˜i¯ succinctly captures the
external impact of internal power injections in Area i; it represents its power interchange schedule.
Therefore, in what follows, those equivalent power injections are associated with interface bids from
external market participants. Hereafter, we drop the word “external” if that does not cause any
confusion.
3.2 Definition of Interface Bids
GCTS uses the same format of bids as CTS. Namely, an interface bid i is defined by a triple
B , {< Bpm, Bqn >,∆pii, smax,i},
where
1. < Bpm, Bqn > is an ordered pair of boundary buses that specifies the bid as withdrawing at
bus m in Area p and injecting the same amount at bus n in Area q. They need not be directly
connected by a tie-line;
2. ∆pii is its price bidding on the anticipated price gap that the bid is settled in the two real-time
markets6;
3. smax,i is its maximum quantity.
The only difference between CTS and GCTS is that, in stead of using a single proxy bus in
each area, GCTS allows bids to be submitted to all pairs of boundary buses across the boundary,
as illustrated in Fig 6.
We aggregate all interface bids with an incidence matrix Mi associated with boundary buses in
Area i. Specifically, each row of Mi corresponds to a boundary bus of Area i, and each column of
which corresponds to an interface bid. The entry Mi(m,k) is equal to one if interface bid k buys
6This may not be equal to the LMP difference. See Subsection III-D and Remark 2 after Theorem 1 for mathe-
matical and economical interpretations.
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Figure 6: Network equivalence on the boundary. Dotted-line arrows represent three interface bids in the
example below: s1 injects at B11 and withdraws at B21; s2 injects at B11 and withdraw at B22; s3 injects
at B12 and withdraws at B22.
power at boundary bus Bim from Area i, minus one if it sells power at bus Bim to Area i, and zero
otherwise. For example, if there are three bids as illustrated in Fig.6, matrices Mi(i = 1, 2) are
M1=
[
1 1 0
0 0 1
]
(B11)
(B12)
,M2=
[
−1 0 0
0 −1 −1
]
(B21)
(B22)
. (4)
Consequently, let s be the vector whose ith entry si is the cleared quantity of bid i. Then Mis
represents the aggregated equivalent power injection induced by cleared interface bids on boundary
buses in Area i. By substituting the right-hand side in (2) by Mis, we have
[
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
][
θ¯1
θ¯2
]
=
[
M1s
M2s
]
. (5)
In (5), the interchange schedule is solely determined by the cleared interface bids from market
participants. In the market clearing process of GCTS, as presented in the next subsection, Equation
(5) will be incorporated as an equality constraint in the optimization model where the internal bids
gi and interface bids s are cleared together.
3.3 Market Clearing Mechanism
GCTS preserves the architecture of CTS; it assumes the presence of a coordinator who collects
interface bids and clears them via a look-ahead dispatch, and the interface bids are settled separately
in the real-time markets. GCTS removes the proxy bus approximation, and its clearing of interface
bids is based on a generalization of JED. The key idea is to clear interface bids by optimizing the
boundary state as follows:
min
{gi,s,θ¯,θi}
c(g1, g2, s) =
2∑
i=1
ci(gi) + ∆pi
T s, (6)
subject to gˇi ≤ gi ≤ gˆi, i = 1, 2, (7)
0 ≤ s ≤ smax, (8)
Hiθi +Hi¯θ¯i ≤ fi, i = 1, 2, (9)
H¯1¯θ¯1 + H¯2¯θ¯2 ≤ f¯ , (10)
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

Y11 Y11¯
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y2¯2¯ Y2¯2
Y22¯ Y22




θ1
θ¯1
θ¯2
θ2

=


g1 − d1
0
0
g2 − d2

 , (11)
[
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
][
θ¯1
θ¯2
]
=
[
M1s
M2s
]
, (12)
where decision variables are the cleared internal generation bids gi with the quantity limit (7), the
cleared interface bids s with the quantity limit (8), and the system states (θi, θ¯) subject to internal
and tie-line power limits (9) and (10). Any bid i with si = smax,i is fully cleared, any with si = 0
is rejected, and any with 0 <si< smax,i is partially cleared at amount si.
Note that, the term ∆piT s represents the market cost of clearing interface bids. Because the price
difference in the real time is in general different from the look-ahead dispatch, market participants
carry a certain amount of risk. Thus the bid ∆pii represents the willingness of the bidder i to take
that risk. See [22] for details of the quantification for risks.
The market clearing model of GCTS (6)-(12) differs from JED in two aspects: (i) the market cost
of clearing interface bids ∆piT s in the objective function and (ii) the additional equality constraint
(12) that determines the boundary state by clearing interface bids subject to their quantity limits.
The coordinator sets the interchange by clearing the interface bids to minimize the overall cost
subject to operational constraints and constraints (8) and (12) imposed by the interface bids.
The clearing problem (6)-(12) of GCTS is a look-ahead economic dispatch where the load powers
di are predicted values. It should be solved in a hierarchical or decentralized manner. Any effective
multi-area economic dispatch method can be employed. See, e.g., [5, 7] where (6)-(12) is solved
with a finite number of iterations.
3.4 Real-time Dispatch and Settlement
Interface bids are settled in the real-time market together with internal bids. There is no coordina-
tion required at this step. Specifically, ISO 1 solves its local economic dispatch with fixed boundary
state θ¯:
min
{g1,θ1}
c1(g1), (13)
subject to H1θ1 +H1¯θ¯1 ≤ f1, (η
R
1 ) (14)
gˇ1 ≤ g1 ≤ gˆ1, i = 1, 2, (ξ¯
R
1 , ξ
R
1
) (15)
[
Y11 Y11¯
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
] θ1θ¯1
θ¯2

=
[
g1 − d
R
1
0
]
,
(λR
1
)
(λ¯R
1
)
(16)
where dR
1
represents real-time internal loads, which may deviate from their predictions in the look-
ahead dispatch (6)-(12). The real-time internal dispatch in each area should be compliant with
the pre-determined interchange schedule. To this end, boundary state θ¯ is fixed at the solution to
Equation (12) with s cleared interface bids solved from (6)-(12). All multipliers are given to the
right of corresponding constraints.
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ISO 1 simultaneously settles internal and interface bids in the real-time market. Internal bids
are settled at the LMP λR
1
. To settle interface bids, we need to analyze the sensitivity of the local
optimal cost in (13) with respect to s. In the real-time dispatch (13)-(16), the impact of interface
bids s is imposed via the fixed boundary state variables θ¯. The sensitivity of local optimal cost
with respect to θ¯ is
∇θ¯c
∗
1 =
[
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯
Y2¯1¯
] [
λR
1
λ¯R
1
]
+
[
HT
1¯
ηR
1
0
]
. (17)
The sensitivity of local optimal cost with respect to s is
∇sc
∗
1=[∇sθ¯]
T∇θ¯c
∗
1=M
T
[
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
]−1
∇θ¯c
∗
1 ,µ
R
1 . (18)
In the absence of tie-line congestion, interface bids pay prices µR
1
in Area 1 and µR
2
in Area
2 (they get paid if µi < 0). In general, interface bids are not settled at LMPs. This is because
the change of the objective function (13) with an increment of cleared s differs from that with an
increment of load power.
If there are tie-lines congested, similar to CTS, we will compute congestion rents according to
the look-ahead dispatch (6)-(12) and subtract them from the payment to interface bidders. Tie-line
congestion prices associated with interface bids are calculated by
ρ =MT S˜T η¯, S˜ = [H¯1¯ H¯2¯]
[
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
]−1
, (19)
where η¯ is the shadow price in (10), and S˜ is the shift factor of boundary buses with respect to
tie-lines in Fig. 6. Similar to CTS, we evenly split the congestion rent price ρ into two areas7.
Namely, market participants pay µRi +
ρ
2
in Area i, i = 1, 2.
If dRi = di, one can prove that the real-time dispatch level and prices are consistent with the
look-ahead dispatch. Note that fixing some variables at their optimal values does not change
optimal values of other primal and dual variables. If the real-time dispatch (13)-(16) is infeasible,
ad hoc adjustments such as relaxations of flow limits can be employed in practice.
4 Properties of GCTS
4.1 Efficiency and price convergence of GCTS
By removing the proxy bus approximation and adopting a strict DC OPF model in (6)-(12), we are
able to establish many important properties for GCTS. Their proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
We first show that GCTS asymptotically achieves seamless interfaces when more and more
bidders participate in the competition at all possible pairs of trading locations. Intuitively, for
GCTS to achieve the cost of JED, two conditions are necessary in general. First, there have to
be enough bidders who try to capture the arbitrage profits across the interface so that they drive
∆pi → 0. This follows the standard economic argument of perfect competition. Second, bids need
to be diverse enough to make the matrixM full row rank so that the tie-line flows of the GCTS can
7When there are more than two areas, tie-line congestions may induce positive shadow prices ρ for interface bids
over other interfaces. Nevertheless, the calculation of ρ is the same as in (19), and the shadow price should be evenly
split by neighboring areas.
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match those of JED. It turns out that both conditions can be satisfied simultaneously by conditions
below.
Theorem 1 (Asymptotic efficiency) Consider a market with N independent interface bidders. As-
sume that (i) both JED and GCTS are feasible and each has an unique optimum, (ii) the number
of aggregated bids for each pair of source and sink buses grows unbounded with N , and (iii) bidding
prices for all participants go to zero as N → ∞, i.e. limN→∞∆pi = 0, then the scheduled tie-line
power flows and generations in each area by GCTS converge to those of the JED as N →∞.
Remark 1: Recall that JED by a “super ISO” provides the lowest possible generation cost,
thus achieving the overall market efficiency. In practice, the power system is artificially partitioned
into multiple subareas that are operated by financially neutral ISOs, and interchange scheduling has
to rely on bids from market participants. Such operational regulations will naturally create seams
at interfaces. Theorem 1 shows that, however, GCTS asymptotically achieves seamless interfaces
under mild conditions. This indicates that GCTS leads to the price convergence between regional
electricity markets.
Remark 2: The price convergence implies that there is no arbitrage opportunity, and that the
dispatch level of GCTS is the same as that of JED. Note that due to congestions, boundary buses
may have different LMPs even under the administration of a “super-ISO”. So the price convergence
is in fact for shadow prices of s. This also explains why interface bids should be settled at µRi in
(18) but not LMPs.
Remark 3: The assumptions that bidding locations are diverse enough and that ∆pi goes to
zero as N increases come from the interpretation that, as the number of bidders increases, there are
always enough bids that can be cleared to satisfy the desired interchange level. Thus individually,
each bidder seeks trading locations with seams and reduces its bidding price so that it will have a
better chance to be cleared.
4.2 Relation Between GCTS and CTS
Next we establish connections between GCTS and CTS. Specifically, we show that the two mech-
anisms are equivalent in a particular simple setting.
Theorem 2 When there is a single tie-line between two areas, the clearing process of GCTS (6)-
(12) provides the same interchange as that of CTS.
Remark: A natural corollary of Theorem 2 is that when there is a single tie-line between two
areas and real-time load is the same as the load considered in the interchange scheduling, then
CTS provides the optimal interchange schedule in the sense that the posterior real-time dispatch
gRi minimizes the total cost of all internal and external market participants.
In practice, however, neither condition in these two theorems is likely to hold. In such cases, our
simulations show that GCTS generally has lower overall cost than CTS and its dispatch satisfies
security constraints. CTS, may on the other hand, may violate security constraints due to the loop
flow problem engendered by its proxy-bus approximation. See Section V for details.
4.3 Revenue Adequacy
In this subsection, we establish the revenue adequacy for the real-time market (13)-(16). Recall
that, in the single-area economic dispatch, each area has a non-negative net revenue, which is
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equal to its congestion rent. We prove in the following theorem that each area achieves its revenue
adequacy in the same fashion in GCTS in an interconnected power system.
Theorem 3 Assume that the real-time dispatch (13)-(16) is feasible and that the settlement process
follows our description in Subsection III-D, then the net revenue of each area is non-negative and
is equal to its congestion rent.
4.4 Local Performance
ISOs are mainly responsible of the efficiencies of their own regional markets, rather the overall
efficiency. Therefore, an ISO may be reluctant to implement any interchange scheduling approach
that worsens its local performance for the sake of the overall efficiency. We partly address this issue
in this subsection.
In the conventional interchange scheduling before CTS, market participants split their bidding
prices into ∆pi = pi1+ pi2 and separately submit them to the two neighboring ISOs who clear these
bids independently. Only bids cleared in both markets will be scheduled [23]. In essence, we take
the minimum of the cleared quantities. In the following theorem, we prove that GCTS achieves
higher local surpluses in all areas than the conventional approach under a simple setting:
Theorem 4 Assume that (i) there is a single tie-line between two neighboring areas, (ii) real-time
load demands are the same as their look-ahead predictions, and (iii) each market clearing problem
has an unique optimum, then there is
L˜Si ≥ LˆSi, (20)
where L˜Si is the local surplus of area i in its real-time market (13)-(16) with θ¯ determined by the
optimal s˜ cleared in GCTS (6)-(12). Specifically, it is defined as
L˜Si , (Di − (λ˜
R
i )
T di) + ((λ˜
R
i )
T g˜i − ci(g˜i)) + f
T
1 η˜
R
1 , (21)
where Di is the constant utility of consumers. Variables with tildes are solved with s˜. The local
total surplus in Area i is the sum of its consumer surplus, supplier surplus, and the surplus of
transmission owners. The local surplus LˆSi with sˆ the result of separate clearing is similarly defined.
We remove this result from our journal submission because this is more about CTS. In general,
when there are multiple tie-lines, Theorem 4 may not hold for GCTS. Nevertheless, it is important
to look into performances in regional markets, especially for power systems that cover multiple
regions or even countries. Investigating weaker conditions for Theorem 4 would be an interesting
direction for future works.
5 Numerical Tests
5.1 Two-area 44-bus system
GCTS was tested on a two-area system composed of the IEEE 14-bus system (Area 1) and the
30-bus system [24] (Area 2). The system configuration and reactance and capacities of tie-lines are
illustrated in Fig.7.
Two groups of simulations were conducted. First, we aimed to illustrate the market clearing
process of GCTS. Second, we compared GCTS with JED and CTS and numerically demonstrated
the asymptotic convergence of GCTS to JED as in Theorem 1.
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Figure 7: Configuration of the two-area power system
5.1.1 Illustration of the market clearing process
Eight interface bids were considered in the first group of simulations. Their trading locations and
prices ∆pi are listed in TABLE 1. Some market participants traded on boundary buses without
direct connections, such as bids 2 and 5. The maximal quantities of all bids were set as 30MW.
From default prices in Area 1, we used a weighting factor w to generate scenarios with various
degrees of price discrepancies. For all scenarios, cleared interface bids, tie-line power flows, marginal
prices, and system costs are presented in TABLE 2:
Table 1: Profile of Interface Bids
Indices Sell to Buy from Price ($/MWh)
1 Bus 15 (Area 2) Bus 5 (Area 1) 1
2 Bus 28 (Area 2) Bus 5 (Area 1) 2
3 Bus 5 (Area 1) Bus 15 (Area 2) 1.5
4 Bus 5 (Area 1) Bus 28 (Area 2) 0.5
5 Bus 15 (Area 2) Bus 9 (Area 1) 1.0
6 Bus 28 (Area 2) Bus 9 (Area 1) 2.0
7 Bus 9 (Area 1) Bus 15 (Area 2) 1.5
8 Bus 9 (Area 1) Bus 28 (Area 2) 0.5
The second block (second to ninth rows) in TABLE 2 lists cleared amounts for interface bids.
With the increase of w, bids delivering power from Area 2 to Area 1 were cleared at greater
quantities, see the fifth and eighth rows, while those delivering power in the opposite direction were
cleared at smaller quantities, see the second row.
The third block includes results on tie-line power flows. They were determined by the boundary
power flow equation (5) and cleared amounts of bids in the second block. When w = 0.1, tie-
line power flows were in both directions. When w was increased, which signified greater price
discrepancies, tie-line power flows became unidirectional from the low-price area to the high-price
area.
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Table 2: Results of Interface Bid Clearing
Weighting factor 0.1 0.15 0.2 1.0
Cleared
quantities
of
interface
bids
(MW)
1 30 30 5.56 5.56
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 30 30
5 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 10.40 30 30 30
8 30 30 30 30
Tie-line bus 15 to 5 -8.66 5.53 38.60 38.60
flow (MW) bus 28 to 9 19.05 41.31 45.84 45.84
Marginal
prices
($/MWh)
bus 5 -0.10 0.02 0.82 15.62
bus 9 2.90 4.34 6.49 45.96
bus 15 1.40 1.04 1.82 16.62
bus 28 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Market
costs
($/h)
Internal 923.2 1148.2 1371.0 4525.4
Interface 58.1 90 80.56 80.56
Total 983.0 1238.2 1451.6 4605.9
The fourth block are marginal prices for all boundary buses in the market clearing process, i.e.,
multipliers associated with boundary equality constraint (12). All bids whose prices were lower
than marginal price gaps between their trading points were totally cleared, see the second, twelfth,
and fourteenth rows when w = 0.1 and the second row in TABLE 1 as an example. All bids whose
prices were higher were rejected, see the third, twelfth, and fifteenth rows when w = 0.1 and the
third row in TABLE 1 as an example. For partially cleared interface bids, marginal price gaps
between their trading points were equal to their bidding prices, see the eighth, thirteenth, and
fourteenth rows when w = 0.1 and the eighth row in TABLE 1 as an example.
The last block are generation costs, costs of market participants, and total costs per hour in
the proposed approach. GCTS considered the total market cost of internal and interface bidders.
5.1.2 Comparison with Existing Benchmarks
In the second group of simulations, we compared the proposed method with existing approaches
on tie-line scheduling. Specifically, the following methods were compared:
i) JED that minimized the total generation cost;
ii) CTS wherein proxy buses were selected as bus 5 in Area 1 and bus 15 in Area 2;
iii) The proposed mechanism of GCTS.
Default generation prices were considered in this test. We used similar bids to those in TABLE
1 for GCTS but their quantity limits and prices were uniformly set as smax = 100MW and ∆pi =
$0.1/MWh. In CTS, all bids were placed at proxy buses with the same quantity limits and prices.
We compared market costs in the look-ahead interchange scheduling as well as those in the
real-time local dispatch. For the latter, we generated 100 normally distributed realizations of real-
time load consumptions whose mean values were their look-ahead predictions (default values in
the system data) and standard deviations were 5% of their mean values. Comparisons on net
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interchange quantities, look-ahead generation costs and total costs, and real-time average total
costs for all samples are recorded in TABLE 3:
Table 3: Comparison of JED, CTS, and GCTS for the Two-area Test
JED CTS GCTS
Net interchange amounts (MW) 87.0 80.3 87.0
Look-ahead generation costs ($/h) 4039.8 4109.9 4039.8
Look-ahead total costs ($/h) – 4118.0 4048.5
Average real-time total costs ($/h) 4096.2 4139.8 4115.7
From TABLE 3 we observed that GCTS achieved lower look-ahead and average real-time costs
than CTS. Specifically, GCTS had lower real-time costs in 88 out of the 100 samples. In addition,
CTS suffered from the loop-flow problem in that branch power flows solved with the global power
flow equation and real-time dispatch levels in both areas deviated from internal real-time schedules.
In this test, average discrepancies on tie-line power flows were 18.25% for Area 1 and 16.38% for
Area 2, respectively. As a result, CTS caused unpredicted overflows for transmission lines in all
of the 100 scenarios, with 2.72 overflowed transmission lines in each scenario on average and the
average ratio of overflows as 11.27%. In GCTS, however, such problems did not exist because it is
based on the exact DC power flow model. Another takeaway of TABLE 3 is that, with sufficient
bids and relatively low prices (∆pi = $0.1/MWh), the interchange scheduled by GCTS was the
same as that in JED in this test.
We illustrate the price convergence of GCTS with different values of w in Fig. 8 by adjusting
the uniform bidding price ∆pi. No bid was cleared when the bidding price ∆pi = $100/MWh.
When ∆pi decreased to small enough values ($0.1/MWh in this test), generation costs of GCTS in
all scenarios were equal to those of JED. In general, the more significant the price discrepancy was,
the faster the price converged. This is consistent with our intuition that market participants could
be cleared at higher prices when there is more room for arbitrations.
Figure 8: Price convergence of GCTS with different bidding prices
Note that such price convergence did not happen in CTS. For the test in TABLE 3, for example,
if we set the bidding price of CTS as zero, the total generation cost would be $4109.7 per hour,
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which was higher than that of JED.
5.2 Three area 189-bus system test
The proposed method was also tested on a three-area system as shown in Fig. 9. The system was
composed of IEEE 14, 57, and 118-bus systems. Power flow limits on all lines were set as 100 MW.
Eight interface bids were considered. For each tie-line, there were two interface bids who traded at
their terminal buses but in opposite directions. The prices and maximum quantities for all interface
bids were respectively set as $0.5/(MW-h) and 100MW.
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Figure 9: Configuration of the three-area power system
The results of market clearing are given in Fig. 10, where internal parts of all areas are rep-
resented by their network equivalences. Cleared interface bids are denoted by power injections at
boundary buses. Power flows through tie-lines are also shown, which were determined by the DC
power flow equation for the network (5) in Fig. 10.
The total cost of the three-area system was $1.263× 105/h, in which the cost of market partici-
pants was $601.43/h and the rest was the generation cost. As a reference, if there is no interchange
at all, the total generation cost would be $1.394 × 105/h. The reduction of generation cost largely
exceeded the cost of market participants.
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Figure 10: Clearing of interface bids and tie-line power flows (MW)
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We did similar comparisons of JED, CTS, and GCTS for this three-area test as in TABLE 4.
In CTS, interchange schedules were set in a pairwise manner, and proxy buses were always selected
as ones with the smallest indices on their sides.
Table 4: Comparison of JED, CTS, and GCTS for the Three-area Test
JED CTS GCTS
Look-ahead generation costs ($/h) 1.255×105 1.261×105 1.257×105
Look-ahead total costs ($/h) – 1.262×105 1.257×105
Average real-time total costs ($/h) 1.255×105 1.263×105 1.263×105
Our conclusions of comparisons were similar to those in the two-area test. GCTS had lower
look-ahead costs than CTS, which was close to JED. Although its real-time costs were similar to
CTS, GCTS removed the loop-flow problem in CTS. Namely, CTS suffered from overflow problems
in 92 out of the 100 scenarios with randomly generated load powers.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to unify major approaches to interchange scheduling: JED that achieves the
ultimate economic efficiency and CTS that is the state-of-the-art market solution. GCTS partially
meets this goal by maintaining the same market structure as CTS while asymptotically achieving
the economic efficiency of JED under given assumptions. GCTS also ensures the revenue adequacy
of each system operator.
Several important issues not considered here require further investigation. Among these are the
impacts of strategic behavior of market participants, uncertainties in real-time operations, and the
asynchronous mode of interchange scheduling among more than two areas.
7 Appendix
7.1 Cases with More than Two Areas
In this subsection, we generalize GCTS to cases with more than two areas. For each area, the
network equivalence is illustrated in Fig. 11. Therein, internal buses are eliminated, and the
equivalent admittance matrix Y1¯1¯ and injection g˜i are still calculated by (3). The calculation of Y1¯1¯
and g˜i only requires local information.
Thereby, the equivalent model of the global power system, corresponding to the Fig. 5, can
be obtained by eliminating all internal buses. An example of a three-area system can be seen in
Fig.10. In the clearing of GCTS with n areas, the constraint (12) becomes


Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯ . . . Y1¯n¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯ . . . Y2¯n¯
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Yn¯1¯ Yn¯2¯ . . . Y˜n¯n¯




θ¯1
θ¯2
. . .
θ¯n

=


M1
M2
. . .
Mn

 s. (22)
The clearing problem can be solved in a distributed fashion via existing solutions like [7], which
is capable to solve problems with more than two areas.
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Figure 11: Network equivalence with more than two areas
The real-time problem of Area i and the settlement process are similar to those of the two-area
case in Subsection III-D.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that the given assumptions ensure that the matrix M = [M1;M2] has full row rank
after removing an arbitrary phase angle reference bus. Without loss of generality, we consider bids
buying from Area 1 and selling to Area 2 and assume the phase angle reference bus is in Area
1. We have assumed that there are infinitely many bids for each pair of locations when N → ∞.
Therefore, we can rearrange interface bids and write the matrix M as follows
, (23)
where the first block of columns includes all bids that buy at the reference bus in Area 1, the second
block of columns includes all bids that buy at the first boundary bus in Area 1, etc. Scalars n1
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and n2 are numbers of boundary buses in Area 1 and Area 2, respectively. One can pick the first
block and first columns in other blocks, as highlighted by red in (23), to obtain n1+n2− 1 linearly
independent columns. Therefore, the M matrix in (23) has full row rank. Same conclusion holds
for the other bidding direction.
Consider the optimal JED solution {gJEDi , θ¯
JED, θJEDi }. For N sufficiently large, there is an sˆ
such that the additional constraint (12) holds for the JED solution in GCTS. Therefore, {gJEDi , θ¯
JED,
θJEDi , sˆ} is a feasible solution of the GCTS clearing problem (6)-(12).
Because ∆pi → 0 as N →∞, we have
lim
N→∞
c(gJED1 , g
JED
2 , s) =
∑
i
ci(g
JED
i ), (24)
which is the lowest possible total generation cost. The claim holds since we assume JED and GCTS
are both convex programs, each having an unique global optimum.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 2
When there is a single tie-line, variables θ¯1 and θ¯2 are scalars. The equivalent network in Fig.6 is
simplified to Fig.12:
Figure 12: Equivalent model with single tie-line
Setting θ¯1 = 0 as the phase angle reference and Area 2 exporting to Area 1 as positive, the
power interchange is given by q = −Y1¯2¯θ¯2. Thereby, the GCTS clearing problem (6)-(12) changes
to
min
{gi,s,θ¯2,θi,q}
c(g1, g2, s) =
2∑
i=1
ci(gi) + ∆pi
T s, (25)
subject to Hiθi +Hi¯θ¯i ≤ fi, i = 1, 2, (26)
q ≤ f¯ = qmax, (27)
gˇi ≤ gi ≤ gˆi, i = 1, 2, (28)
0 ≤ s ≤ smax, (29)[
Y11 Y11¯
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯
] [
θ1
0
]
=
[
g1 − d1
q
]
, (30)
[
Y22 Y22¯
Y2¯2 Y2¯2¯
] [
θ2
θ¯2
]
=
[
g2 − d2
−q
]
, (31)
q =M2s. (32)
Here the matrix M2 is composed of 1 and -1, depending on directions of interface bids. Note that
when q is fixed, the problem (25)-(32) can be decoupled into three sub-problems:
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i) Local economic dispatch in Area 1:
min
{g1,θ1}
c1(g1)
subject to: H1θ1 ≤ f1,
gˇ1 ≤ g1 ≤ gˆ1,[
Y11 Y11¯
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯
] [
θ1
0
]
=
[
g1 − d1
q
]
.
(33)
ii) Local economic dispatch in Area 2, which is similar in form with (33);
iii) The optimal clearing of interface bids given the total amount q:
min
s
∆piT s
subject to: q =M2s,
0 ≤ s ≤ smax.
(34)
Therefore, GCTS is to search for the optimal q∗ ∈ [0, qmax] that minimizes the sum of objective
functions of the three sub-problems. Note that in Fig.2, pi1(q) is the derivative curve of problem
(33) with respect to q, pi2(q) is the negative derive curve of the local problem in Area 2, and ∆pi(q)
is the negative derivative of (34). Therefore, the solution of CTS in Fig.2 or Fig.3 is the same as
that of GCTS (25)-(32).
7.4 Proof of Theorem 3
For Area 1, from the optimality condition for (13)-(16) we have
∇{θ1}L1 =
[
Y11 Y11¯
] [ λR
1
λ¯R
1
]
+HT1 η
R
1 = 0, (35)
where L is the Lagrangian of (13)-(16).
By left-multiplying (θ∗
1
)T to (35) we have
(θ∗
1
)T∇{θ1}L1 =(g1−d1)
TλR
1
+ fT
1
ηR
1
− [θ¯T
1
θ¯T
2
](
[
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯
Y2¯1¯
][
λR
1
λ¯R
1
]
+
[
HT
1¯
ηR
1
0
]
)
=(g1−d1)
TλR
1
+fT
1
ηR
1
−sTMT
[
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
]−1
∇θ¯c
∗
1
=(g1−d1)
TλR
1
+fT
1
ηR
1
− sTµ1 = 0.
(36)
In the absence of tie-line congestion, Equation (35) already proves the revenue adequacy. When
tie-line congestions happen in the look-ahead dispatch, the corresponding congestion rent yield
f¯T η¯=[θ¯T1 θ¯
T
2 ]
[
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
][
Y˜1¯1¯ Y1¯2¯
Y2¯1¯ Y˜2¯2¯
]−1[
H¯T
1
H¯T
2
]
η¯=sTρ. (37)
From (36) and (37), we finally have
(d1−g1)
TλR1 +s
T (µ1 +
ρ
2
)=fT1 η
R
1 +
f¯T η¯
2
> 0. (38)
Equation (38) proves Theorem 3. The left-hand side is the net revenue that ISO 1 collects
from internal and external market participants, and the right-hand side is the sum of the internal
congestion rent and a half of the tie-line congestion rent which is afforded by Area 1. Note that
the net revenue in (38) is non-negative because all terms on the right-hand side are non-negative.
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7.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Let q˜ = 1T s˜ and qˆ = 1T sˆ. We first prove that q˜ ≥ qˆ. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, the
separate clearing in Area 1 is
min
{g1,θ1,s,q}
c1(g1) + pi
T
1
s
subject to: H1θ1 ≤ f1,
gˇ1 ≤ g1 ≤ gˆ1,[
Y11 Y11¯
Y1¯1 Y1¯1¯
] [
θ1
0
]
=
[
g1 − d1
q
]
,
q =M2s,
0 ≤ s ≤ smax.
(39)
Next we parameterize (39) with respect to q. According to [8], the optimal value of (39) is an
piecewise affine and convex function of q, denoted by J1(q). We can similarly derive J2(q) for Area
2.
Letting qi be the optimal solution of Ji(q), we have qˆ ≤ min{q1, q2}. Also q˜ is the optimal
solution of J1(q) + J2(q). If q1 = q2 = q, then q˜ ≥ qˆ. Otherwise, we have
J1(q1) < J1(q˜) < J1(q2), (40)
J2(q2) < J2(q˜) < J2(q1). (41)
There are two possibilities that q˜ is smaller than both q1 and q2: (i) q˜ < q2 < q1 which violates
(40), (ii) q˜ < q1 < q2 which violates (41). Therefore, there is always q˜ ≥ qˆ.
Considering the importing area whose real-time dispatch model is (33), there is ˆ¯λR
1
> ˜¯λR
1
and
we have
L˜Si − LˆSi = ci(gˆi)− ci(g˜i) +
ˆ¯λR
1
qˆ − ˜¯λR
1
q˜
≥ ˜¯λR
1
(q˜ − qˆ) + ˆ¯λR
1
qˆ − ˜¯λR
1
q˜
= qˆ(ˆ¯λR
1
− ˜¯λR
1
) > 0.
(42)
Considering the exporting area whose real-time dispatch model is (33) but the term q is replaced
by −q, there is ˆ¯λR
1
< ˜¯λR
1
and we have
L˜Si − LˆSi = ci(gˆi)− ci(g˜i)−
ˆ¯λR
1
qˆ + ˜¯λR
1
q˜
≥ ˜¯λR
1
(qˆ − q˜)− ˆ¯λR
1
qˆ + ˜¯λR
1
q˜
= qˆ(˜¯λR
1
− ˆ¯λR
1
) > 0.
(43)
There CTS achieves better local surpluses in both local markets.
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